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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 




ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD 
KIMBERLY D. JONES, 
Supreme Court Do ket TO. 37146.2009 
Twin Falls County Docket No. 
2009-2955 
Defendant-Appellant. 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Appellant on November 23, 20lO. Therefore, good cause 
appeanng, 
IT HEREBY J ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRA TED and the augmentation record shall include the d cument listed below, 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Suppress filed in State v. Flieger, 
Twin Falls ounty Dist. Ct. Case No. CR 2008-4112, file-stamped December 9, 2008. 
(This document was reviewed by the district court in conjunction with its disposition in 
Ms. Jones case, as is apparent from the district court's remarks at the hearing on Ms. 
Jones' motion to suppress. (See 7/24/09 Tr., p.46, L.7-p.51, L.20)). 
DATED this l day of December 2010. 
For the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
cc: Counsel of Record 
AUGMENI lION .. ---... .. ~ ___ 
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) Case No. CR 2008-4112 
) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) AND ORDER RE: 





TIlis matter is before the Court on Defendant Theresa Flieger' s Motion to Dismiss 
or Suppress. An evidentiary hearing was held on November 13, 2008. TIle State was 
represented by Deputy Prosecutor Jill Sweesy. Ms. Flieger appeared in person and was 
represented by Attorney Robin Weeks. Oral argument was presented at the conclusion 
of the presentation of evidence. Ms. Flieger requested additional time to file a response 
brief to issues raised by the state during the hearing. The brief was filed on December 3, 
2008 and this matter is deemed submitted for decision as of December 4, 2008. For the 
reasons stated herein, Flieger's Motion is GRANTED. 
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RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 1 
· NOV-08-2010 TUE 01: 30 PM urt Services FAX NO, 736 4155 
P. 04 
FACTUAL OVERVIEW 
This action arose on April 27, 2008, when Officer Isaiah Day of the Twin Falls 
Police Department stopped a vehicle driven by the defenda~t, Th.eresa Fliegel' (Flieger). 
The stop was lawful; as Flieger was stopped after being paced driving 40 miles-per-hour 
in a 35 mile-per-hour zone. 
Upon stopping the vehicle, Officer Day recognized Flieger from prior contacts 
between Flieger and local law enfotcement. Officer Day noted that Flieger was the only 
occupant of the vehiclei her hands were shaking -uncontrollably and Flieger appeared to 
be nervous and upset at the officer's presence. Officer Day requested that Flieger 
provide him. with her driver's license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance; 
however, she was un.able to provide any of the requested information to the officer. She 
was, however, able to provide an Idaho identification card which was valid and which 
identified Flieger to the officer's satisfaction. Offi.cer Day was also able to determine 
that, although Flieger did not have her driver's license with her, she had a valid Idaho 
license. Nevertheless, based upon Fliegel's demeanor/behaviorl along with Officer 
Day's knowledge of criminal history involving members of Fliegel"s family! the officer 
arrested Flieger for not having her driver's license on her person, a violation of Idaho 
Code §49-316. 
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Upon arrest, a cursory search was performed and a small aluminum bindle 
containing a white crystalline substancel was found in Flieger' s pocket. Flieger was 
ta.ken into custody and delivered to the Twin Falls County jail. 
ANALYSIS 
This case presents a straightforward issue regarding the legality of Flieger' 5 
arrest for failing to carry hel'valid driver's license on her person. If her arrest was 
lawful, then a sea,rch incident to that arrest is likewise lawful. SeeChirnel v. California, 
395 U,S, 752 (1969); State v. Foster, 127 Idaho 723, 726, 905 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Ct. App, 
1995). Flieger contends that the search at issue h,ere cannot be justified as a search 
incident ,to her arrest because the arrest was unlawful. 
In Idaho, failing to carry and exhibit one's driver's license on demand is a 
misdemeanor. I.C. §49-316, "As a general proposition, a police officer may, without a 
warrant, make an arres·t for a misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence. I,e. § 
19-603(1). This general arrest authority is modified, however, with respect to 
misdemeanor violations of Title 49 ofthe.Idaho Code, which regulates motor vehicles 
and their operation;" State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 7781 781, 963 P.2d 12151 1218 (Ct. App, 
1998), Thus, flfor misdemeanor traffic violations, an officer must issue a cii'ation rather 
than make an an:est unless there exist circumstances under which an arrest is 
The substance was later tested by the Idaho state laboratory and fotmd to contain 
methamphetamine. 
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specifically 'required or permitted' under Title 49." 131 Idaho at 782,963 P.2d at 1219 
(emphasis added.) See also I.e. §49-1409. 
In IdahoJ no statute requires an atrest for failing to carry and exhibit one's 
driver's license on dem.and. Thus, the question here is whether there is any authority to 
"permit" the arrest of an Idaho resident for not exhibiting their driver's license without 
meeting the criteria of I.e. § 49-1407i the courtcondudes that there is no such authority 
in Idaho. 
The state contends that the statute for which Flieger was arrested contains within 
it the necessary permission for an arrest. Idaho Code section 49-316 reads: 
Every licensee shall have his driver's license in his 
immediate possession at all times when operating a motor 
vehicle and shallt upon demandt surrender the driver's 
license into the hands of a peace officer for his inspection. 
However, no person charged with a violation of the 
provisions of this section shall be convicted if a driver's 
license issued to the person and valid at the titne of his arrest is 
produced in court 
(Emphasis added). 
The state argues that this language grants permission to arrest, since there is 
otherwise no purpose. to the use of the "time of arrest" language. Ms. Fliegel: counters 
by pointing out that "permission" to arrest is circumscribed by the standards set forth in 
49-1407 and that "arrest" is subject to multiple interpretations, which indudet but are 
not limited to being taken before a magistrate. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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TIle court determines first that section 49-316 is ambiguous as to 'the issue 
presented here; therefore, the statute is subject to s"tatutory interpretation. See State v. 
Gonzales, 144 Idaho 775, 780, 171 P.3d 266, 271 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Rhode, 133 
Idaho 459, 462,988 P.2d 685/ 688 (1999) (the court may engage in statutory construction 
only where the statutory language is subject to conflicting interpretations). 
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which an appellate court 
exercises free review. State v. Parker, 141 Idaho 775, 777,118 P.3d 107, 109 (2005). 
Statutory construction must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words 
must be given their plaint usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be 
construed as a whole. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719,721 (2003). 
Moreover, U[w]hen this Court must engage in statutory construction, it has the 
duty to ascertain the legislative intent and give effect to that intent," State v. Rhode, 133 
Idaho 459, 462,988 P.2d 685,688 (1999). To ascertain the intent of the legislature, not 
only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the context of those 
words, the public policy behind the sta~tet and its legislative history. Id. It is 
incumbent upon a court to give a s"tattlte an interpreta'tion which will not render it a 
nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct.App.200l). Any 
construction of a statute that would lead to an absurd result is also disfavored. State v. 
Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275, 92 P.3d 521, 525 (2004); State v, Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 690, 85 
P.3d 656, 666 (2004). 
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Thus, in order to resolve this issue tile court looks to the statute as a whole - in 
this instance, sections 49~316, -1405, -1407 and ~1409 of the Idaho CQde. The court 
,. '". 
begins with Idaho Code section 49-14091 which provides: 
Issuance of traffic citation 
Whenever a person is halted by a peace officer for a 
misdemeanor traffic violation and is not taken before a 
magistrate as .required or permitted by this title, the officer 
shall issue a citation as provided by . . . Idaho Code" and by 
rule of the supreme court. 
(Emphasis added). 
As was noted previously, there is no starutory authority requiring arrest for 
failing to exhibit one's driver's license to a, peace officer. In fact there is only one,./ 
statute, Idaho Code section 49-1405, which requires that certain serious misdemeanor 
violators be taken before a magistrate. Two additional statutes, 49-1407 and 49~14082 
p, 08 
permit discretionary arrests of violators of Title 49 under specific conditions. The court 
is not aware of, and the state did not cite to any other statute which, in plain language, 
grants authority for deviating from the general rule prohibiting arrest fot vehicular 
misdemeanors as provided by Foldesi and Idaho Code section 49-1409. 
This statute, while allowing officers discretionary authority to arrest, applies only to non-Idaho 
residents. It is therefore inapplicable to the issues presented in this case. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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It is noteworthy that section 49-1405 provides that for certain serious 
misderneanors$ the authority to arrest is the same as for a felony and arrest is required. 
However, section 49-1405 lists three other serious offenses4, for which arrest is optional 
and officers maintau1. "the same discretion as is provided by law" to cite or to a.rrest. 
Section 49-1405 is silent as to any other code section which requires an offender to be 
taken before a magistrate. 
The "discretion [to arrest] as provided by law" is set forth specifically in section 
49-1407. The pertinent portion of that statute reads: 
Whenever any person is halted by a peace officer for any 
misdemeanor violation of the provisions of this title and is 
not required to be taken before a magistrate, the person 
shall, in -the discretion of the officer, either be given a traffic 
citation or be taken without unnecessary delay before the 
proper magistra.te as specified in section 49-1411, Idaho 
Code, in the following cases: 
(1) VVhen the person does not furnish satisfactory 
evidence of identity or when the officer has 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe the 
person will disregard a written promise to appear in 
court. 
The state argues that section 4:9~316 also grants permissive authority to arrest 
because it references Uiime of arrest" generally within the statute. This court disagrees, 
1) negligent homidde; 2) driving whtle under the influence of alcohol; 3} driving while under the 
influence of drugs; and 4) failing to stop and render aid in the event of an accident resulting in death or 
personal injuries. 
4 1) Failing to stop for.a damage accident; 2) reckless driving; and 3) fleeing or attempting to elude 
a peace officer. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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concluding ,that section 49-316 lacks specificity required to permit an arrest in the 
officer's discretion. 
It is "well established that '[a] specific statute .. , controls over a more general 
statute when there is any conflict between the two.' II Estate oj Collins v. Geistl 143 Idaho 
82t 827, 153 P.3d 1167, 1173 (2007) (quoting Tuttle v. Waymenf' Farms, Inc., 131 Idaho 105, 
108,952 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1998)). In construing a statute, this court will not "deal in any 
subtle refinemenl:s of the legislation, but will ascertain and give effect to the purpose 
and intent of the legislature, based on the whole act and every word therein, lending 
substance and meaning to the provisions." Curlee v, Kootenai CountlJ Fire & Rescue, 2008 
WL 4595239, 7 (Oct. 16, 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting George W. Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 539-4,0, 797 P.2d 1385, 1387-88 (1990). 
Considering tIle II entirety" of Title 49 leads this court to conclude that police 
officers have no authority to arrest for alleged violations of Idaho Code §49-316. The 
rationale for such a decision is as follows: firstJ section 49-1407 and section 49-1409 are 
much more specific regarding the issue presented here than is section 49-316. Sections 
49~1407 and -1409 give specific detail regarding the authority to arrest, versus the 
authority to simply issue a citation. Section 49-316 merely references the "time of 
arrest" to establish the required date when one must have a valid driver's license in 
order to obtain a ministerial dismissal of the charges. Nothing in this statute specifies 
when, or under what circumstances such an "arres'c" is 01' is not proper. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
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Second, section 49-1407 was adopted5 in 1955, and section 49-1409 was adopted6 
in 1983, whereas section 49-316 was adopted7 in 1935. Given the later-adopted statutes' 
specificity, they provide a dear-cut framewotk to guide an officer's discretionary 
authority to arrest for vehicular misdemeanors. Accordingly, fuese more recently 
enaded statutes control over the 70+ year-old section 49-316. State v. Callaghan, 143 
Idaho 856, 859, 153 P.3d 1202, 1205 (Ct. App. 2006) (under well-established principles of 
statutory construction, Q. statute which specifically applies to the particular 
circumstances of a ca.se is controlling over an older and more genexal statute); State v. 
Galaviz, 104 Idaho 328, 331 658 P.2d 999, 1002 (Ct. App. 1983); Owen v. Burcham, 100 
Idaho 441, 444, 599 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1979). 
Third, the court construes the words" at the time of arrest" in light of the 
"context of those words, [and] the public policy behlnd the statute .. .. " State v. Rhode, 
supra, 133 Ida.ho at 462,988 P.2d at 688, as well as against the backdrop of "the whole act 
and every word therein .... " Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, supra. In 
construing the totality of Title 49, this court concludes that the legislature's more-recent 
adoptions proscribing an off.icer's discretion to arrest for vehicular misdemeanors leads 
to the public policy conclusion that driving a vehicle without one's license is not a crime 
for which an arrest is warranted, absent the specific criteria of section 49-1407(1) being 
5 
7 
1955 Idaho Session Laws, eh. 84, §3S, p. 182 
1983 Session Laws, ch. 25, §l2, p. 72 
1935 Session Laws, ch. 88, §19, p. 160 ' 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS - Page 9 
· NOV-09-2010 TUE 01:32 PM ourt Services FAX NO, 8 736 4155 P. 12 
mef:8. It would be an "absurd result" for the legislature to provide an officer unbridled 
discretion to arrest for failing to present one's driver's license upon demand, while 
limiting that discretion for more serious offenses, sud:1 as driving without a valid 
license, reckless driving, or eluding an officer. Cf Foldesi, 131 Idaho at 782,963 P.2d at 
1219. 
Finally, since a charged defendant under section 49-316 can have charges 
dismissed by simply showing a valid license to a deputy clerk of the court, the charge is 
much less serious than failing to have a valid license to drive, for which an officer must 
issue a cita.tion absent certain very specific exceptions. See id. j 131 Idaho at 782-83,963 
P.2d at 1218-19; see also State v. Brown, 139 Idaho 707, 85 P.3d 683 (Ct. App. 2004) (the 
circumstances under which an arrest for driving with an expired license are specified in 
I.e. §49-1407)i Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572,579 (9th Cir.1989) (law enforcement officers 
may not lawfully arrest for driving without a valid license unless the criteria of section 
49-1407 are met). The state's argument, taken to its logical conclusion is that an officer 
may arrest and incarcerate a citizen merely for leaving their valid driver's license at 
home; whereas a person driving without a valid license cannot be arrested. 11.1is court 
concludes that such a construction of the statute would lead to an illogical result whjch 
B The state conceded at the hearing in this matter that none of the factors aUowing an offender to be 
brou.ght before a magistrate under section 49-1407 were present at the lime of Flieger's arrest and that 
Fliegel" s arrest and incarceration could not be justified under that statUte. 
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is disfavored. See State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271,275,92 P.3d 52t 525 (2004); State v. 
Yager, 139 Idaho 680,690,85 P.3d 656, 666 (2004). 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, based upon the analysis set forth herein, Officer Day did not have 
authority to arrest Ms. Flieger for failing to display her driver's license at the time of the 
stop. As such, the evidence and sta'tements obtained afl:er the officer's initial contact 
with Flieger are SUPPRESSED. 
DATED ll1is 9!h day of December, 2008. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 3- day of Decemberj 2008, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order was mailed, postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the 
following persons: 
JillSweesy 
Twin Falls County 
Deputy Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
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Robin Weeks 
Twin Falls County Deputy Public 
Defender 
P.O. Box 126 
Twin Fait ID 83303 
